The violent attack on Mumias East MP Peter Salasya on March 23, 2025, during a football match between Kenya’s Harambee Stars and Panthers of Gabon is a concerning development for Kenya as we approach the 2027 general elections. On this occasion, Salasya who is a vocal and youthful politician was allegedly assaulted by individuals claiming that his recent public utterances on social media and on television show a lack of respect for opposition leader Raila Odinga. This attack on Salasya, widely discussed on platforms like X, underscores alarming sentiments that could destabilize Kenya’s political landscape if immediate mitigation and preventive measures are not taken.
The violent attack on Salasya reflects a recurring pattern in Kenya’s election cycle mostly characterized by ethnic tensions, political intolerance, and rivalries. A case in point is the 2007-2008 post-election violence that led to the death of over 1,100 people and displacement of 600,000. This violent conflict was fuelled by similar dynamics such as ethnic mobilization, political loyalty enforcement, and a winner-take-all electoral system. Salasya’s attackers, reportedly linked to the Orange Democratic Movement Party (ODM) supporters, highlight how loyalty to political figures like Raila Odinga can morph into aggressive expressions of allegiance. This incident suggests that dissent within political parties, or across communities is likely to trigger a shift in loyalties and may increasingly be met with violence, a trend that could escalate as the 2027 elections approach.
The danger for Kenya lies in several interconnected factors. First, such acts signal a growing intolerance to political diversity, which undermines democratic principles. Salasya, who has declared ambitions to run for president or governor in 2027, represents a younger generation challenging established power structures. If violence becomes a tool to silence figures like him, it risks alienating youth and fueling resentment, potentially driving them toward radical responses rather than electoral participation. Second, the ethnic undertones of the attack by some people may send a divisive signal pitting Luhya against Luo tribes who have not only peacefully co-existed for decades but also maintained unity in political alignments. The danger of giving the attack an ethnic dimension is that it may propagate tribal divisions and hatred which have been key drivers of past electoral unrest. With President William Ruto likely benefiting from a fragmented opposition, as some X posts suggest, this could incentivize further manipulation of ethnic tensions for political gain.
Moreover, Kenya’s devolved system, while designed to diffuse national power struggles, has intensified local contests, making county-level rivalries in elective positions like those in Kakamega or Mumias flashpoints for violence. The Salasya incident, tied to regional power dynamics, exemplifies how local grievances can spiral into broader conflict during election periods. If unchecked, this could replicate the 2007 scenario, where localized violence snowballed into a national crisis, exacerbated by distrust in institutions like the police and electoral bodies. The timing of the attack, over two years before the 2027 elections amplifies the risk further. Early violence suggests a simmering volatility that could worsen as campaigns heat up. Historical data from ACLED indicates the year 2022 saw over 1,060 political disorder events, the highest since 1997 driven by protests and riots. If the year 2025 incidents like Salasya’s assault are any indication, 2027 could surpass this, especially if economic woes (e.g., post-COVID poverty) and misinformation amplify public frustration.
For Kenya to avoid this trajectory, leaders must condemn violence unequivocally, strengthen security impartiality, and address root causes like ethnic patronage and impunity. Without intervention, the Salasya case could be a harbinger of a turbulent, divisive election, threatening Kenya’s stability and democratic progress.
Article by Absolom Shalakha (Edited by Peter Osodo, Programs Manager, C4P)
About the Author – Absolom Shalakha, a Kenyan national, has over fifteen years of professional experience in Governance, Climate Action, and Peacebuilding; particularly in Mediation, Prevention of Violent Extremism, Research, Conflict, and Project Management at different levels. This includes working in various conflict zones in Kenya (as the National Adviser for Conflict Early Warning and Early Response at Peace-Net Kenya); Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Sudan (Conflict Researcher). In Nigeria, he has provided technical and program expertise to ensure the efficient, effective,e and sustainable execution of various projects and mediation initiatives in Plateau, Kaduna, and Borno States, where he helped design and pioneer the first-ever online mediation program and tools to support Mediation. Additionally, he designed and Supported Capacity Building Training on Mediation in North East Nigeria, targeting both State and Non-state actors, including formal and informal security organizations in Borno and Yobe States.
Absolom graduated with a Bachelor’s degree in Education and Human Resource Management from Kenyatta University and holds a Master’s degree in International Conflict Management from the University of Nairobi. Additionally, he is a Columbia University’s Human Rights Advocate Program Fellow (HRAP 2013) as well as a Chevening Fellow at the University of Bradford, United Kingdom, where he studied International Peacekeeping and Capacity Building. He has taken additional courses at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Center in Accra, Ghana, and the United States Institute of Peace in Washington D.C. in Peacebuilding and conflict management. He is the Director; of Partnerships, Programs, and Resource Mobilization at Change for Planet Foundation. He also serves as the Vice-Chairperson for Peace and Security, ICGLR-Kenya CSOs Chapter, and represents the Kenyan CSOs in the Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflicts (GPPAC) as the focal person.
